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ABSTRACT 
The Horn of Africa has become an epicenter of interest for the global community due to 
the drastic increase in piracy. Indicative of the Gulf of Aden’s strategic importance is the 
fact that more than 30,000 ships per year and 3 million barrels of oil per day transit the 
Suez Canal. Indicative of the severity of the problem of piracy is the fact that more than 
30 countries are committing naval forces as part of a solution to the problem. The 
international community seeks to secure the area and protect the global economy. This 
thesis attempts to provide an innovative sustainable capacity building conceptual model 
to tackle piracy through the employment of cutting edge technological assets, i.e tethered 
aerostat radar sensors, UAVs and picosatellites. The economic and technical feasibility of 
the proposed conceptual model is tackled respectively by illustrating a scenario and 
providing an economic cost benefit approach regarding the cost of the proposed 
infrastructure. The conceptual model consists of a complex set of various components 
that, together, build an integrated architectural set constituting an innovative, alternative 
capacity-building model aiming to secure maritime traffic corridors, and at the same 
reducing the economic cost significantly and the number of deployed naval assets.   
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The Horn of Africa is of strategic importance considering its geographical 
features, mainly its proximity to the Suez Canal. During the last two decades, this area 
has become the epicenter of interest for the global community due to the drastic increase 
in piracy. Indicative of the Gulf of Aden’s strategic importance is the fact that more than 
30,000 ships per year and 3 million barrels of oil per day transit the Suez Canal. 
The challenge of piracy is recognized globally; the special conditions of this area 
create a unique set of considerations and circumstances for policy makers. Indicative of 
the severity of the problem is the number of think tanks and regional experts that have 
focused on this issue, as well as the fact that more than thirty countries are committing 
naval forces as part of a solution to the piracy problem. However, a solution that requires 
the economic support of a large number of naval units patrolling has a severe economic 
impact. The current global economic recession makes the situation even worse. Although 
this deployment of naval forces provides our navies a solid objective, no government 
expects or wants its naval forces to become part of a permanent anti-piracy patrol in the 
Gulf of Aden similar to the US forces stationed in Korea.  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The international community in contemporary times is facing serious challenges 
in many domains. Issues like terrorism and piracy have entered our daily lives. An 
imperative need is generated to tackle efficiently all these challenges. From the rocky 
mountains of Iraq and Afghanistan to the sea commons in the Horn of Africa, the only 
tool historically proven capable of addressing these challenges is Capacity Building. 
The major research question in this thesis is the following:   
Which capacity-building strategy in the Horn of Africa will most likely 
produce a solution to the piracy problem? 
A major consideration in deciding which capacity-building course of action to 
pursue lies on how the political situation ashore will evolve. 
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This thesis attempts to provide innovative solutions to tackle piracy. The majority 
of regional experts agree that piracy can only be effectively addressed if the coastal states 
assume responsibilities and exercise effective control over their constituents. Considering 
the complexities of the region, this is an optimistic scenario. In the case where political 
challenges on shore result in a stalemate, the international community should take the 
necessary steps towards capacity building to secure the area and protect the global 
economy independently of the anomalies happening ashore.    
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a consensus in the literature that the roots of piracy are located ashore in 
political and regional instability. It is clear that piracy only occurs under conditions of 
weak control over littoral waters and weak institutions that are unable to secure the 
maritime domain. In the long run, such weaknesses cause destabilization in the wider 
area, and piracy occurs.1 Hansen’s study on piracy in the Gulf of Aden highlights the role 
of individuals and local institutions connecting these broader conditioning factors to the 
particular pattern of piracy in the region.2 There is also broad agreement that weak 
economies, which make piracy an attractive occupation to young unemployed men, also 
contribute significantly to the rise of piracy.3  
Despite the consensus on the origins of piracy, local and international 
perspectives on the phenomenon of piracy vary quite significantly.  Somalis claim that, in 
many cases, they are protecting their waters from foreign trawlers. Also, there have been 
accusations that, due to the lack of coast guard capabilities, attempts were made to 
illegally dump toxic waste in Somali territorial waters.4  Furthermore, there are 
international reports verifying the severe economic damage the Somali economy has 
                                                 
1 Adam Young, Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: History, Causes and Remedies 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), 16–18.   
2 Stig J. Hansen, Piracy in the Greater Gulf of Aden: Myths, Misconception and Remedies (Oslo, 
Norway: Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research, 2008), 23. 
3 Ibid., 7. 
4 Robert I. Rotberg, “Combating  Maritime Piracy,”  World Ppeace Foundation policy brief,  January 
26, 2010. http://www.worldpeacefoundation.org/WPF_Piracy_PolicyBrief_11.pdf (accessed April 27, 
2010), 4–5. 
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suffered from foreigners, leading some Somalis to see pirate attacks on large ships 
outside Somali fishing areas as a justifiable redistribution of income.5 Locals often do not 
refer to pirates as pirates, but rather as marines, who they believe to be committed to 
protecting Somali territorial waters as a consequence of the state failure in 1991.6 
While it is widely accepted that the lack of central governance has led to the rise 
of piracy and that the exceedingly weak but internationally recognized government in 
Mogadishu is incapable of implementing an effective anti–piracy policy, there is debate 
about whether Islamist groups, which are much stronger than the Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG), and clan elders, who often continue to exercise significant authority 
at the local level, could do so. 7 Some analysts note that both sets of actors have 
expressed strong opposition to piracy and have proven that at least in the short term and 
under some conditions, they can in fact effectively address piracy. Others argue that Al 
Qaida-affiliated Islamist groups act as business partners with the pirates and thus cannot 
be part of the solution, and that clan elders are only able to exercise authority over a very 
limited space and very specific circumstances. Therefore, the international community is 
facing the serious dilemma of whether to support extreme Islamists in power in order to 
counter piracy, when no one can guarantee that there is no linkage between such 
extremists and terrorist groups.8 
Some authors argue that an obstacle to effective counter-piracy in our era is that 
the piracy operations are self-supporting, due to the fact that pirates are very well 
organized and use modern technology, and that paying the relatively low ransoms 
demanded is cost-effective for ship owners. This practice among shipping companies 
allows and even encourages pirates to continue their illegal activities.9 
                                                 
5 Lauren Bloch, Christopher Blancard and Ronald O’Rourke, Piracy off the Horn of Africa, CRS 
Report for Congress, R40528 (Washington, D.C., 2009), 10.   
6 Mohamed Adow, "Al Jazzera." Demand Al Jazzera. June 17, 2009. 
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2009/06/2009614125245860630.html  (accessed April 27, 2010). 
7 Melissa Simpson, An Islamic Solution to State Failure in Somalia?  Geopolitics of the Middle East 2, 
no. 1 (January–March, 2009), 31–35.  
8 Ted Dagne, Somalia : Current Conditions and Prospects for a lasting Peace, CRS Report for 
Congress, (Washington D.C., October 2010), 13. 
9  Ploch, Piracy off the Horn of Africa, 12–13.   
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Piracy is now considered a universal crime, and is prosecuted by a large number 
of countries.10 However, there is a wider consensus that piracy’s roots are located ashore 
and, usually, it is a consequence of political and regional instability. In our age, piracy is 
occurring in two areas of major strategic interest, the Gulf of Aden and the Malacca Strait 
in South East Asia (where the cooperation of regional governments has yielded tangible 
results).  It becomes clear that piracy signals weak control over littoral waters in the 
region and weak local institutions that are unable to secure their seas and consequently 
generates destabilization to the involved states. 11 
This literature review stresses that the problem of piracy in the Horn of Africa and 
how this issue can be effectively addressed depends on how the international community 
can find innovative ways to intervene in cooperation with local institutions and 
implement modern technologies.12  Consequently, it is important to develop a capacity—
building strategy in accordance with the political developments ashore. In addition, there 
are allegations that pirates are affiliated with terrorist groups, so there is a great incentive 
for the international community to intervene.13 
The sea commons in the Gulf of Aden have strategic importance, due to the 
Gulf’s proximity to the Suez Canal and the dependence of the international community 
on natural and manufactured resources that inevitably have to transit this maritime 
passageway.  Over the past several years, there has been an increase in the number of non 
state-actors that have challenged the safety of these maritime corridors and constitute a 




                                                 
10 William R. Slomanson, Fundamental Perspectives on International Law California (Belmont, CA: 
Wadworth Thompson Learning, 2007), 245.   
11 Young, Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: History, Causes and Remedies, 15–18.  
12 Jeff Kline, Maritime Security in Securing Freedom in the Global Commons ed. by Scott Jasper, 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 81–82. 
13 Simpson, An Islamic Solution to State Failure in Somalia? 45. 
14 Kline, Maritime Security, 68–70. 
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international community must tackle these challenges and threats coming from non-state 
actors. Otherwise, these commons will be used by non-state actors to fulfill goals that, 
 in their vast majority violate international law. 15 
The best way to address this threat is by considering the complexities in the area 
on all levels, from societal fragmentation in clans and sub-clans to specific geographic 
features of the region. Furthermore, in principle, there are some basic considerations that 
must govern this policy. These considerations can be summed up as the following: The 
policy to counter all these threats must be based on local, regional, and international 
collaboration; otherwise, all efforts to deal with this issue will ultimately fail.16 
However, in order to successfully coordinate this effort on the long coastline of 
Somalia, special care and attention should be given to the unique conditions of this area. 
Specifically, this must be a long-term policy aiming to overcome great difficulties such as 
high governmental corruption and the fact that many Somalis consider piracy a reliable 
professional choice.17 Also, many Somali pirates consider themselves protectors of their 
waters against foreign trawlers that illegally fish.18 
In order to achieve an effective maritime control of the dangerous areas, modern 
technologies under innovative concepts should be followed. Specifically, tethered 
aerostats, and satellite assets can be used to monitor large maritime areas without the 
necessity of disposing directly naval forces. Due to the limited number of available naval 
units, this capacity development strategy could reduce the economic cost of current naval 
operations.19  
The current literature recognizes that piracy originates from regional instability 
ashore and emphasizes building strong local institutions. However, the building of strong 
                                                 
15 I. Kline, Maritime Security, 68–70. 
16 Ibid., 82. 
17 Hansen, Piracy in the Greater Gulf of Aden, Myths, Misconception and Remedies, 9. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Inside the Navy, Navy Eyes Aerostats  for  Affordable, long  duration, Surveillance  19, no. 49, 
December 2006, http://www.tcomlp.com/resources/TCOM%20Inside%20the%20Navy%20Reprint%2012-
06.pdf ww.defence.com  (accessed on 29 September 2010).  
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institutions is a long-term strategy that requires a lot of support and efforts. This thesis 
will introduce concepts such as using the capabilities of satellite assets or other man-
made assets, like aerostats, in order to establish a recognized maritime picture along the 
dangerous coastal areas and support safe maritime corridors for the merchants transiting 
the Gulf of Aden in the short-term. These latter concepts can be developed and allow 
major international actors like the United States and the European Union to support the 
tactics discussed above.  
C. THESIS OUTLINE  
The structure of this thesis will include six chapters, composed of an introduction, 
development, analysis and conclusions as described below. In the introductory Chapter, 
this thesis will focus on describing the political problem of Somalia and the complexities 
that create conditions for piracy to grow and why the international community should 
follow a different approach in fighting piracy.  This thesis will argue that governments 
should help tackle the problem by implementing innovative concepts with the aid of new 
technologies to reinforce secure maritime corridors in the Gulf of Aden.  
Chapter II discusses about the causal mechanisms of piracy in the HoA and 
Southeast Asia. Furthermore, it introduces the concept of a capacity-building model, 
which focuses on addressing the issue from a domestic and an international aspect as 
well, and then introduces the need for innovative capacity building methods of tackling 
this issue.  
Chapter III presents cutting-edge technologies (UAVs, Tethered Aerostats with 
embedded Radar sensors, satellite assets) that are applicable to maritime domain 
awareness and MIO operations.  
In Chapter IV, this thesis tests the feasibility and effectiveness of building the 
infrastructure models described in Chapters II and III—concerning tethered aerostats with 
embedded radar sensors—by illustrating a maritime scenario in which two merchant 
ships considered as high-value units (HVUs) transit through the Horn of Africa. Their 
main objective is to arrive safely to their destination, successfully avoiding piracy attacks. 
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In Chapter V, a cost-benefit analysis of an air monitoring system consisting of 
tethered aerostats with embedded radar sensors is presented, in comparison to the current 
economic cost of deploying a large number of naval assets.  
Finally, the last chapter restates conclusions on how and why capacity building of 
a cutting edge infrastructure in the Horn of Africa will efficiently reduce piracy incidents. 
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II. REGIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING 
Piracy is an historical phenomenon that dates back to the thirteenth century B.C, 
when men initiated commerce transactions. However, the causal mechanism of piracy has 
shifted throughout the years. In order to understand the causes of piracy in contemporary 
years it would be useful to present the causal mechanisms of piracy in the HoA and 
Southeast Asia, two strategic areas considered as chokepoints that share a number of 
similarities.   
A. CAUSAL MECHANISM OF PIRACY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA 
The literature on this issue concludes that the causal mechanism of piracy in the 
Horn of Africa includes the following factors: “intrastate conflicts, geography, cultural 
shifts, ship owner policy, and weak political and security enforcement institutions.”20  
For the past two decades, Somalia has been suffering from a civil war between clans, 
ending up being a failed state. Likewise, due to domestic issues, Yemen is facing the 
danger of becoming a failed state. Both of these countries are involuntary hosts to pirate 
groups because internal conflicts provide pirates the supportive environment to direct and 
conduct operations.21 
Geography plays an important role. Somalia’s coastline is estimated to be around 
2000 miles long. Since no coastguard or navy patrols these waters, pirates are able to 
conduct their operations from a number of different bases with impunity.  Historically, 
the rise of piracy has been supported by the proximity of the Gulf of Aden to the Suez 
Canal.  Yemen’s geography is also attractive to pirates due to its long coastline and 
proximity to high-traffic maritime corridors.22 
                                                 
20 Stephen L Riggs, Piracy in the Horn of Africa: A Comparative Study with Southeast Asia, Thesis, 
Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009. 
http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2009/Dec/09Dec_Riggs.pdf, 8. 
21 Hansen, Piracy in the Greater Gulf of Aden, Myths, Misconception and Remedies, 49–51. 
22 Ibid., 50. 
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Piracy is tacitly supported by a cultural shift on the part of the local populations 
towards a more lenient sympathetic judgment of the pirates. One of the main 
characteristics of the area is poverty, and piracy provides money to the area. Many young 
Somali males view piracy as an optional professional choice.23 
Finally, two important contributors to the rise in piracy in the area are the lack of 
a strong judicial/legal system and security enforcement mechanisms. The failed-state 
status of Somalia limits its ability to put on trial any of the alleged pirates. Furthermore, 
the European Union member states are unwilling to sign any anti-piracy agreement with 
Yemen, due to the fact that Yemeni legislation opposes European Union laws regarding 
human rights on the issue of the death penalty. Consequently, the international 
community followed a different path, signing a memorandum with Kenya and Seychelles 
allowing these countries to try alleged pirates.24 
Another aspect of this issue is the fact that piracy involves   a number of 
jurisdictional restrictions that the international community must overcome in order to 
intervene. In 2008, after a request from the Transnational Federal Government (TFG) in 
Somalia, the United Nations issued resolution UNSCR 1851 allowing the pursuit of 
suspected pirate ships inside Somali territorial waters by foreign non-Somali naval 
units.25   
B. CAUSAL MECHANISM OF PIRACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Southeast Asia is the other geographical area where, according to statistics, piracy 
still occurs, and where it is worth attempting to distinguish the regional factors leading to 
piracy. The literature leans toward the same factors as those in the Horn of Africa, but in 
an obviously different context.26  
                                                 
23 Rotberg, Combating  Maritime Piracy, 4. 
24 Kline, Maritime Security, 78. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Martin Murphy, “Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: The Threat to International 
Security,” Adelphi 47, no. 388 (June 2007), 13.   
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The Malacca strait geography is as important as the Gulf of Aden, since the 
Malacca strait is considered one of the most important global strategic shipping routes. 
Indicative of the strait’s importance is that half of world trade goes through this choke 
point.27 The Malacca strait is about 600 miles long and is the frontier between the three 
states of Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. Specific features like the strait’s width (in 
some areas it is only 1.5 miles wide), make it conducive to attacks. 
Furthermore, the emergence of piracy has been helped by the fact that these 
countries do not have the necessary technological assets and means to keep an effective 
watch over the whole length of the strait. Pirates were left free after the Cold War to 
continue their attacks since there was no competent security authority to establish order 
in the Strait of Malacca.28 
In Southeast Asia from ancient times and in recent history since the 18th century, 
piracy has provided a supplementary income to some villages. In order to avoid poverty, 
a number of people found in piracy a supplementary income. The poverty in the region 
was so high that local fishermen were tempted by the sight of large ships transiting at 
very low speeds due to local draft limitations. 29 In a sense, the pirates follow the same 
tactic as the pirates in the HoA; they ask for a low ransom, which after negotiation may 
end up at only a few thousand dollars- a relatively small amount in the global economy 
that represents an extremely high amount in the local community.30 
Finally, piracy is helped by the unique geography and proximity of national 
borders in specific parts of the strait. The littoral states were motivated to view this 
problem as a domestic and not a regional problem, a view that inevitably led to a conflict 
of intra-regional interests. This conflict was further escalated due to the fact that these 
countries, (as former colonies), are extremely sensitive about sovereignty issues.31 
                                                 
27 Sam Bateman, “Regime Building in the Malacca and Singapore Straits: Two Steps Forward, One 
Step Back,” Journal of the Economics of Peace and Security, no. 2. (2009), 45.  
28 Riggs, Piracy in the Horn of Africa: A Comparative Study with Southeast Asia,26. 
29 Murphy, Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: The Threat to International Security, 17.   
30 Riggs, Piracy in the Horn of Africa: A Comparative Study with Southeast Asia,29. 
31 Ibid., 24. 
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C. CAPACITY BUILDING IN THE HOA 
The preceding analysis of the causal factors of piracy in the HoA and in Southeast 
Asia clearly demonstrates the problematic nature of this issue by stressing its domestic 
and international dimensions.  Consequently, it becomes obvious that only a consistent 
capacity building policy against piracy will effectively address this issue.  
Capacity building can be defined as:  
Planned development of (or increase in) knowledge, output rate, 
management, skills, and other capabilities of an organization through 
acquisition, incentives, technology, and/or training.32 
The best way to address the piracy threat is by considering the complexities in the 
area on all levels, from societal fragmentation in clans and sub-clans to specific 
geographic features of the region. Furthermore, in principle, some basic geo-political 
considerations must govern this policy, in particular, anti piracy efforts should be based 
on local, regional, and international collaboration; otherwise, all efforts to deal with this 
issue will ultimately fail. 33  The international community can offer temporary solutions 
by deploying naval task forces (i.e., Operation Atlanta / Ocean Shield / Allied Provider) 
or by providing weak littoral states with logistical support and aid to exercise more 
effective maritime control over their areas of responsibility. However, both methods 
mean many countries must incur a significant economic burden.34 
The issue of piracy can be addressed permanently only when the involved states 
establish and have strong local institutions, such as police and coastguard forces.  The 
moment such strong local institutions evolve the level of all criminality including piracy 
will be reduced significantly. Capacity Building is the best path to accomplish a 
permanent solution. However, this cannot occur over a short period, but only after a 
coordinated series of efforts from the international community in cooperation with locals.  
                                                 
32 Business Dictionary Com, Capacity Building Definition, 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/capacity-building.html, (accessed on 10 August 2010). 
33 Kline, Maritime Security, 78–81. 
34 Rotberg, Combating  Maritime Piracy, 2. 
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D. CAPACITY-BUILDING MODEL IN THE HOA 
The literature on the issue of piracy has analyzed and demonstrated in depth that 
the origins of piracy are located ashore and mainly lie in the lack of strong local 
institutions and a central governing authority. However, the impact of piracy is global 
and its cost is estimated to be in the range of $billion.35  The political situation in Somalia 
has been in a stalemate since 1992, after the disastrous 1991 UN intervention. The 
international community is very hesitant to deploy ground forces. The prospect of losing 
soldiers’ lives would also exact, a severe domestic political cost for the governments of 
countries that might deploy ground troops to establish and maintain for some period local 
order through the founding and perpetuation of efficient in-country institutions.  
Capacity building against piracy, as has been eluded previously, should have a 
domestic, regional, and international component. 36 Consequently, a modern antipiracy 
strategy should entail an “innovative non-kinetic policy.” 37 In particular, this thesis 
proposes the adoption of a model analogous to the model developed for the Maritime 
Domain Protection in the Straits of Malacca in 2005 by the NPS Meyer Institute.38 
Specifically, consolidating all anti-piracy efforts under one command would significantly 
boost the efficiency of the disposed naval patrolling forces in the area.39Furthermore, this 
thesis proposes the establishment of a large scale, air-monitoring system supported by 
naval assets.  This air monitoring system would primarily consist of tethered aerostats 
with embedded radar sensors, suitable for maritime domain surveillance. The command 
infrastructure would be supported by a minimum number of naval assets tasked to deter 
pirates and respond when pirate groups are detected. This new architecture would be 
                                                 
35 Ploch, Piracy off the Horn of Africa, 12–13.    
36 Kline, Maritime Security, 78–81. 
37 Peter Chalk, Power Point presentation for “Maritime Piracy off the Horn of Africa,” Center for 
Civil Military Relations, September 2010. 
38 Jeff  Buschmann et al. Maritime Domain Protection in the Straits of Malacca. Monterey, CA: 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2005, 
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Institutes/Meyer/docs/2005/2005_sea7part1.pdf; 
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Institutes/Meyer/docs/2005/2005_SEA7Part%202.pdf (accessed August 
20, 2010), 1–5.  
39 Chalk, Maritime Piracy off the Horn of Africa.  
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under the direct command of Command Control and Maritime Fusion Center established 
in a regional country. One challenge of this conceptual model would be if the majority of 
the naval assets supporting the air monitoring system are provided by regional entities.40     
However, the international community, through organizations like NATO, should 
support navies from regional countries through institutions specialized in providing anti-
piracy training. One institution providing the discussed training operating in accordance 
with NATO standards is the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Center 
(NMIOTC) in Crete, Greece. 41 Through NMIOTC, NATO offers such required training 
in the following fields: “MIO plan development ,Surface, subsurface and aerial 
surveillance , Boarding process , MIO aspects of Special Operations , MOTC courses to 
the members of Partnership for Peace (PfP) and MD (Mediterranean Dialogue) 
countries.”42 
The model described above will be analyzed thoroughly in the following chapters. 
The international aspect of the issue focuses on securing the sea commons in the Gulf of 
Aden. However, there is a domestic component, in particular despite the bad political 
situation; there are actions to be taken on a domestic level. 43  A number of actions that 
could potentially reduce piracy incidents on a domestic level are stated below 
The first step should support the local communities economically in order to 
provide young Somalis opportunities and incentives to reject the prospect of becoming 
pirates.  Somalia is composed of three different political entities, Somaliland, Puntland, 
and the area under the control of the official Transitional Federal Government (TFG). 
Although, the TFG has a limited role, since the area under its rule is estimated to be only 
a few building blocks in Mogadishu, the governing authorities of Puntland and 
Somaliland on a domestic level have proven to be efficient in building strong local 
                                                 
40 Kline, Maritime Security, 78–81. 
41 NATO Maritime Interdiction Operation Center (NMIOTC), Training Areas and ACT Courses, 
www.nmiotc.gr, (accessed in October 6, 2010). 
42 Ibid. 
43 Chalk, Maritime Piracy off the Horn of Africa. 
 15
institutions, i.e., coastguard and police, and their efforts should be supported. 44 Another 
promising development that requires further support is the Somali Coastguard that was 
recently founded; however, it is poorly equipped, operating only a dozen of skiffs. 45 A 
policy strengthening equipment wise and enhancing the “know how” of the local 
institutions of the political entities in the area would cause a drastic reduction of piracy 
incidents since it would allow law enforcement mechanisms to put their hands on pirates 
on their own court. 46 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
Piracy is a source of regional instability and promotes as well the continuation of 
the present, chaotic, maritime security stalemate. The strategic significance of the Gulf of 
Aden with respect to global commerce is fundamental; consequently, the international 
community should take all necessary measures to secure, the safe passage of international 
shipping. Unfortunately, only a limited number of actions are available to touch the 
shelters of piracy, and ultimately, deter pirates permanently. The only efficient course of 
action to be followed focuses on securing the sea commons, and, specifically instigating 
an innovative capacity building, pursuing  the integration of  innovative technological 
assets. In particular, the current method of dealing with piracy by deploying naval units 
apart from being only partly effective is also very expensive for the contributing 
countries considering that a monthly deployment of a frigate-size ship is $1.3 million. 47 
Thus, the high cost piracy of piracy generates a sustainability issue which in the long run 
would lead the involved countries to pursue alternative innovative methods of tackling 




                                                 
44 Chalk, Maritime Piracy off the Horn of Africa. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid.  
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III. INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGIES APPLICABLE TO 
MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONS (MIOS) AND 
MARITIME SURVEILLANCE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA 
The modern maritime environment presents many challenges to the international 
community. The issue of piracy is a hot issue in the global security arena, since 70% of 
the earth’s surface is covered from water and the vast majority of humanity is highly 
dependent on the sea and its goods. It is widely known that piracy is an ancient 
phenomenon, but many seem to forget that anti-piracy efforts are also very old. Another 
key factor is the degree of advanced technologies utilized by modern pirates that 
automatically provide them a strategic advantage over merchant ships. Epigrammatically, 
the Gulf of Aden is a huge maritime domain where, currently, the international 
community is attempting to address piracy via the deployment of naval units. Although 
more than 30 countries have deployed naval forces, in 2009 there was an increase in 
piracy attacks, reaching 196 attacks.48 Furthermore, as it was eluded in the previous 
chapter, a sustainability issue is generated since it is highly questionable if the involved 
countries would continue contributing naval forces and on the same time producing 
moderate operational results in regards to the number of piracy incidents. The statistics 
from the IMB in 2009 are a clear indication that a different policy should be pursued that 
is more efficient and less expensive. 
The main reason this chapter is incorporated into this thesis research is to enhance 
some sporadic “out of the box” thoughts that policymakers are significantly interested in 
effectively tackling the issue of piracy should consider.  Innovative considerations 
include the utilization of aerostats, satellites and/or other suitable unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs) in maritime surveillance and MIOs, using technologically advanced 
assets in a pioneering and innovative fashion would severely reinforce anti-piracy efforts.  
                                                 
48 ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report, 
United Kingdom, January 1 – December 31, 2009. 
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A. TETHERED AEROSTAT RADAR SENSORS 
1. History and Current Deployments  
Aerostat operations date from the American Civil War, and since then they have 
been heavily utilized operationally in the field. Today, aerostats are deployed in a wide 
spectrum of operations, covering from operations in Afghanistan to a monitoring system 
in the southern borders of the United States for drug interdiction. The Tethered Aerostat 
Radar System (TARS) area of responsibility covers the southern US border from Mexico 
to the Caribbean.49 The latter monitoring system was established in the 1980s and each 
aerostat is embedded with a radar sensor.  Specifically, the TARS system payload 
consists of AN/DPS-5 S-band CFAR/MTI and AN/TPS-63 search radars. The operational 
endurance of aerostats can last up to a month and their footprint is around 200 miles. 50 
Finally, another significant contemporary operational application of aerostats in 
modern challenges is the JLENS (Joint Elevated Netted Sensor System), which has the 
capacity to detect long- range missiles and has an embedded, radar sensor payload. The 
latter system is employed by the US Army.51 
2. Description of Tethered Aerostats   
Tethered aerostats form a category of air systems that can be easily characterized 
as non- conventional since they do not have fixed rotary wings. The majority of these 
network balloon systems are employed in surveillance missions with embedded radars, 
consist of four main parts, “Radar sensor, wind screen, airborne power generator, rigging 
tether assembly and hull.” 52 
                                                 
49Department of the Air Force, Tethered Aerostat Radar System, Air Combat Command Public 
Affairs Office, (January 
2003),http://www.acc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet_print.asp?fsID=2359&page=1 (accessed 29 
September 2010).   
50 Ibid. 
51  Christopher Bolkcorn, Potential Use of Airships and Aerostats, CRS Report for Congress, 
(Washington D.C., 2004) , 2. 
52 Ibid. 
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The majority of hulls are manufactured of polyurethane-coated fabric. The upper 
part is larger and contains the required helium to remain at the proper altitude. The 
ballonet lower part is subject to the effect of pressure, and its shape is affected by the 
various pressure changes related to the aerostat altitude. The windscreen is also under 
helium pressure and is the compartment facilitating the radar.53 
 
 
Figure 1.   Tethered Airborne Radar Systems54 
The whole structure is supported through suspension and mooring lines that can 
anchor aerostats at elevation of up to 15,000 feet.55 
3. Operational Advantages From Using Tethered Aerostats 
Currently, there is strong debate over unmanned air assets and how they can be 
optimally utilized. Inevitably, this discussion involves aerostats and what they can offer 
to tackle modern challenges mankind is facing. In regards to maritime domain 
surveillance, this technology can offer a number of serious advantages. Aerostats can 
assume a variety of roles based on the wide variety of payloads they can carry. In 
particular, they can function as communication relay assets, but there is also great 
potential in ISR missions. In maritime missions, especially the main need emerging from 
                                                 




modern security issues is to create sea-based assets able to detect and identify threats in a 
timely manner. 56 The role that seems fit for aerostats is “persistent surveillance”; this 
thesis proposes a conceptual model which consists of an air monitoring system for high-
traffic maritime zones appears as the most suitable.57 
Another set of advantages is that currently similar systems are already operational 
and there is a general body of knowledge available concerning the range of capabilities 
and limitations. 58 An important aspect of employing aerostats in maritime surveillance 
missions is the fact that their economic costs are low and they have a long period of 
operational life. 59 Yet another argument supporting their use is their low radar cross 
section and they are fabricated in a fashion that builds in resistance to various 
punctures.60 However, a caveat when utilizing aerostats is that they are affected when 
strong winds blow. Practically, while meteorological phenomena of strong winds occur in 
an area, an alternative method of conducting ISR should be at hand and pursued until a 
technological solution is found to bypass this limitation.61  
                                                 
56 Bolkcorn, Potential Use of Airships and Aerostats 2–4. 
57 Inside the Navy, Navy Eyes Aerostats for Affordable, Long-Duration, Surveillance.  
58 Bolkcorn, Potential Use of Airships and Aerostats, 4. 
59 Ibid.  




Figure 2.   JLENS schematics62 
However, another interesting application concerning the operational usage of 
aerostats is based on a concept developed by the U.S. Coastguard in the1980s and 1990s. 
63  Specifically, the concept was based on a naval asset that had an embedded aerostat 
system that was launched when required. These assets were utilized against drug 
smugglers with success; their main task was to provide surveillance information to the 
other patrolling units in the area. 64 
 
                                                 
62 Defense Industry Daily, Air JLENS Concept,   
http://media.defenseindustrydaily.com/images/AIR_JLENS_Concept_lg.jpg, (accessed on 03 October 
2010). 
63 United States Coastguard, Aerostat Program, http://www.uscg.mil/history/articles/Aerostat.asp, 




Figure 3.   A schematic of a coastguard ship with en embedded aerostat radar system65 
An innovative approach against piracy would involve the development of modern 
units capable of carrying aerostats with a large footprint, equipped with advanced radar 
systems delivering high resolution capable of identifying pirate’s mother ships.66  
 
Figure 4.   The operational concept when deploying ships  
with an embedded radar system67 
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the concept behind an operational scheme employing 
embedded aerostats on naval assets. Obviously, one of the advantages of deploying an 
asset as described above is the fact that it can be considered a sea-based unit capable of 
                                                 




covering a large area for a long period of time in the heart of the problem, significantly 
reduces reaction time, when supported accordingly. The operational advantage when 
deploying ships with an embedded aerostat radar system lies on the rapid detection of 
potential pirate’s mother ships.  
Another promising application of maritime surveillance systems based on the 
utilization of tethered aerostats would be what is currently being developed by the Israeli 
Armed Forces and has received considerable interest from other countries. In 2009 India 
procured two (EL/M 2083) Aerostat Radars. 68 However, EL/M 2083 radar mainly 
function against low fast moving aircraft.69 On the other hand, a maritime application of 
a tethered aerostat constellation system could be embedded with a radar system designed 
to operate in a maritime environment, taking into account that the discussed aerostat 
system could safely maintain an altitude of 15,000 feet, and carry a payload of up to two 
tones.70  In particular, the main challenge in securing a maritime domain through this 
concept is the acquisition of radar capable of covering an area of such size with high 
resolution. A trustworthy solution might involve the utilization of 3D, phased-array radar 
system.  
B. INNOVATIVE USAGE OF SATELLITE ASSETS IN MARITIME 
SURVEILLANCE 
1. Introduction 
Another innovative approach regarding MIO operations involves the use of space-
based technologies, in particular picosatellites, in a non-traditional fashion (See Figures 6 
and 7). 71  
                                                 
68 Strategic Page, India buys Israeli Aerostat Radars. 
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htada/20090123.aspx, accessed on (11 October 2010). 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Alex Bordetsky, Micro and Pico Satellites in Maritime Interdiction Operations, 15th International 
Command & Control Research & Technology Symposium, June 2010, 17–19. 
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Picosatellites are the satellite assets that weight less than 1 kgr. The table below 










Table 1.   Small Satellite Categories 
 
Figure 5.   A Picosatellites in Orbit73 
                                                 




Large > 1000 kgr 
Medium 500 - 1000 kgr 
Mini 100 – 500 kgr 
Micro 10 -100 kgr 
Nano 1 – 10 kgr 
Pico 0.1 – 1 kgr 
Femto < 100 gr 
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Figure 6.   A Close Picosatellite Photograph74 
The picosatellite models described previously, although perhaps not initially 
developed to operate against piracy , could be easily used in the wider area of the Horn of 
Africa (HoA), after the adoption of a number of modifications, in  maritime surveillance 
nissions. However,  it is important to stress that. although there is great potential in this 
field, it has not been fully exploited or given the required attention. 75 
2. Operational Advantage Using Picosatellites 
Due to their size, small satellites inherently face a number of operational 
limitations; consequently, picosatellites are not always applicable to all MIO missions. 
However, they do have a number of advantages that we can   make the best use in order 
to achieve reliable operational results.76 
Picosatellites offer users global coverage with only 4–6 satellites. The cost of 
deploying picosatellites is acceptable, since the rocket launching system has the 
capability of re-launching over thirty times.77 Another advantage of using picosatellites is 
that their ground stations can be all over the world, without restriction, something that is 
convenient for maritime domain protection missions since they are not geographically 
                                                 
74 Bordetsky, Micro and Pico Satellites in Maritime Interdiction Operations, 17–19. 
75 Georgios Mantzouris, Picosatellites in MIO Tracking WMD Materials, NMIOTC Journal l (2010), 
15–17. 
76 Mantzouris, Picosatellites in MIO Tracking WMD Materials, 15–17. 
77 Ibid. 
 26
anchored. In addition to the above, picosatellites can remain in orbit for more than 
seventy days, a feature allowing persistent maritime surveillance.78 
3. Operational Features of Various Picosatellites 
a. Tubesat – Interorbital Company 
Currently, a considerable number of operational picosatellites are capable 
of participating in MIOs, i.e., Tubesat – Interorbital Company. The operational features 
of the discussed satellite are listed below:79 
 
Property Description 
Weight 0.75 kg 
Endurance Up to 3 months 
Orbital 
Altitude 310 Km 
Standalone 
System 
Capable of relaying Space 
to Earth Video 
Table 2.   Main features of Tubesat Satellites 
b. European Space Agency Satellite Receiver for Global Tracking 
of Ships  
Another innovative concept being developed by the European Space 
Agency (ESA) in cooperation with the private sector provides   a trustworthy alternative 
to the issue of piracy. The fact that this system operates in the space domain offers 
potential users a high number of advantages and, most importantly, its operation does not 
come across any geographical or jurisdictional constraints. 80  
 
 
                                                 
78 Mantzouris, Picosatellites in MIO Tracking WMD Materials, 15–17. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid.  
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Figure 7.   ESA's AIS Signal Coverage81 
A significant advantage to the use of a constellation of satellites for MIOs 
where the detection capability is mainly based on signal receiving is the limited number 
of satellites required to accomplish global coverage, approximately five. 82  Nowadays, 
all ships which hold a tonnage above 300 tonnes are obliged to be carry an AIS system; 
consequently, a space monitoring systems that takes advantage of this signal is a great 
tool in regards to maritime surveillance.  
C. UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (UAVS) 
1. Introduction 
UAVs have become a crucial tool in all kinds of warfare. There is a large number 
of deployments where UAVs are employed. The history of UAVs dates back to the 
American Civil War where they were first used as a carrier of explosives to the enemy’s 
                                                 
81 Mantzouris, Picosatellites in MIO Tracking WMD Materials, 15–17. 
82 Ibid. 
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lines. Since then UAVs have been employed in all major conflicts but, due to rapid 
technological development, the spectrum of operational capabilities has increased 
tremendously, providing the senior tactical commander a wide spectrum of capabilities 
starting from real time picture to launching efficient weapons.  
The first Gulf War and the war in the Balkans in 1990s clearly demonstrated that 
a wise operational deployment of unmanned assets like UAVs offers a strategic 
advantage over any enemy. There is a lot of research effort in manufacturing compact 
UAVs since, in spite of their size; they can carry cutting edge technological assets.  They 
could be critical assets in MIO operations where the main interest in utilizing UAVs is to 
monitor large maritime areas and long coastlines that periodically shelter pirates. Finally, 
the next generation of UAVs will be more efficient, more compact, less expensive and 
friendlier to their respective operators, capable of participating in complex missions.83 
According to the 2003 Naval Transformation Roadmap, Information Surveillance 
Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities will be greatly enhanced when the next generation of 
air assets is officially deployed. Specifically, UAVs that are tasked to perform maritime 
surveillance equipped with various sensors and that are networked will play an important 
role in the “reach, coverage and persistence of the naval Information Surveillance 
Reconnaissance (ISR) system across the full range of the intelligence spectrum.”84  
Future advanced maritime networks involve a comprehensive set of “air assets, manned 
and unmanned, and sea-based and land-based assets.”85 
2. Innovative Use of UAVS on Maritime Domain Awareness in the Horn 
of Africa 
There is a vast literature covering the issue of UAVs and currently extensive 
research is being conducted on potential applications. Apart from widely known 
applications i.e SCANEAGLE and GLOBAHAWK that presently or in the near future 
                                                 
83 J. R. Reinhardt, James J. E. Flanagan, Future Employment of UAVs, Joint Force Quarterly (1999), 
36–37.     
84 Department of the Navy, Transformation Roadmap, Assured Access & Power Projection from the 
Sea, 2003, 71. 
85 Ibid. 
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after modifications are capable of performing maritime surveillance missions; this thesis 
proposes the usage of already available UAVs in a pioneering fashion.  
The Hellenic Naval Academy (HNA) is developing a mini Helicopter that 
presents significant potential in the area of maritime domain awareness in the HoA. The 
mini-helicopter is named Vellerofontis, and was obtained from the commercial sector. 
The capabilities provided through this mini-helicopter are a comparative advantage over 
other UAVs including the ability to perform a short take off and to land on a ship deck. 86 
 
 
Figure 8.   Vellerofontis during a flight carrying a camera streaming video.87 
Vellerofontis is remotely controlled and carries a video camera that can be also 





                                                 
86 Ioannis Koukos, Maritime Situational Awareness through Unmanned Mini Helicopter, NMIOTC 






Useful load ~ 4kgr 
Range ~ 7 nm 
Speed 80-100 Km/h 
Camera FOV 30◦ 
Table 3.   Vellerofontis operational characteristics 
Vellerofontis includes these promising capabilities:89 
1. Secure Image Transmission. 
2. A flight system capable of conducting an autonomous flight with 
predefined flights.  
3. Integration of an IR or Synthetic Aperture Camera as a sensor 
system that can transmit real time Video.  
4. Integration of a light WMD sensor.  
In sum, Vellerofontis introduces an innovative way to tackle threats related to the 
Maritime Domain Awareness at a very low price. The low cost in accord with the small 
size, makes it possible to utilize Vellerofontis in a number of cases.  In boarding 
operations, Vellerofontis could be deployed in advance to conduct pre-boarding checks 
and assure the existence of the necessary pre-conditions for the boarding team to be 
actually deployed. 90   Furthermore, in the near future, Vellerofontis could potentially 
carry a WMD sensor and relay signals indicating the existence of WMD material back to 
a central unit for further evaluation.91  Vellerofontis is currently used for training 
purposes in NMIOTC, and the lessons learned from various training exercises clearly 
indicate the large number of potential applications in maritime interdiction operations.92 
                                                 






A great number of innovative applications could be utilized in maritime 
surveillance missions. However, since not all meet the standards of each mission, the 
selection of technological assets assigned in each mission should be performed with great 
caution and consideration; otherwise money may be spent carelessly and at the same time 
jeopardize maritime security.   The technological assets discussed in this chapter present 
significant potential, and a strong case can be made that the potential utilization of these 
assets would provide a new momentum to anti-piracy efforts and policies.  
Specifically, the utilization of tethered aerostats in a maritime surveillance role 
constitutes a resourceful approach. Still, there are many issues to be addressed in 
advance. The most intriguing challenge is the selection of radar incorporating all the 
desired features. A modern application that should be further investigated is a 3D phased-
array radar with AIS equipment embedded providing an effective footprint up to 200 nm. 
The next two chapters demonstrate the technical and economic feasibility of an 
anti-piracy strategy in the Gulf of Aden that utilizes tethered aerostat systems with 
suitable radar sensors, supported by a minimum number of naval assets, and coordinated 
from a command and control center stationed in one of the regional countries. Finally, the 
most important advantage of using aerostat radar systems to fight piracy is their mobility, 
a property that is crucial since the pirate shelters are not geographically anchored. This is 
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IV. MARITIME SCENARIO 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Horn of Africa has become an epicenter of interest for the global community 
due to drastic increases in the levels and boldness of piracy. Since the piracy 
phenomenon occurs in the high seas it is very difficult to test proposed conceptual 
models, consequently an initial scenario was developed in order to determine if there is 
any potential involved in the described capacity model of maritime surveillance. 
Consequently the scenario described in this chapter was developed.  This scenario’s 
hypothesis is the following: The establishment of an aerial monitoring system consisting 
of aerostats mainly  and other unmanned aerial vehicles along the Somalia coast, 
supported by a minimum number of naval assets and a stronger command and control 
system, would effectively strengthen anti-piracy efforts. 
In order to achieve an effective maritime control of the contested areas, modern 
technologies under innovative concepts should be followed. As addressed, tethered 
aerostats can be used to monitor large maritime areas without the necessity of directly 
disposing naval forces. In particular the concept proposed focuses on the use of aerostats 
in order to establish consistent, recognized maritime picture along the dangerous coastal 
areas and support safe maritime corridors for the merchants transiting the Horn of Africa.  
B. PURPOSE 
The main scope of the scenario presented in this chapter is to demonstrate the 
feasibility of conceptual models that would tackle the issue of piracy effectively in the 
sea commons, specifically in the Horn of Africa. The proposed conceptual model consists 
of a complex set of various components and which together build an integrated 
architectural set constituting an innovative, alternative approach into securing maritime 
traffic corridors. Apart from specific assumptions explicitly stated below, the scenario 
does not take into account the contemporary regional diplomatic and political agenda that 
develops in the Horn of Africa. The long-term objective of this study is to produce a 
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conceptual model that, under proper modifications, could provide an alternative solution 
to the issue of piracy and is characterized by three main features: 
(a) Cost effectiveness 
(b) Advanced Technologically 
(c) Participation of regional countries 
Historically, in a vast number of issues, capacity building has been more effective 
whenever locals and regional players are involved. A good example where the collective 
effort for maritime security succeeded is the Strait of Malacca, where piracy occurred 
extensively.93 The challenge of this chapter is to present the feasibility of a large-scale air 
monitoring system supported by minimum number of naval assets. For this scenario, the 
Paretto set concept was used to select an optimal solution satisfying all the involved 
parameters (design variables, functional constraints, criteria constraints) which are 
defined in each problem individually. 94 
C. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS) 
In order to discover the optimal configuration of advanced technological assets, it 
is fundamentally important to explicitly state the proposed concept of operations 
(CONOPS) and avoid misdirecting efforts. 
 CONOPS:  The Operational utilization of cutting-edge technological assets 
(Tethered Aerostats + suitable radar sensors) in conjunction with a Maritime Command 
and Control Fusion Center and with the support of a minimal number of naval assets 
(Naval and Coastguard Units) would provide an alternative solution to address piracy, 
regardless of the political anomalies happening ashore.  Based from the previously  
 
 
                                                 
93 ICC, International Maritime Bureau. Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report, 
(United Kingdom, January 1 – December 31, 2009). 
94 Tomoyuki  Hiroyasu, Shinpei Chino, Mitsunori Miki, “Flexibility of Design Variables to Pareto-
Optimal Solutions in Multi Objective Optimization Problems,” IEEE Congress on Evolutionary 
Computation (CEC 2007), 4262–4468. 
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described CONOPS, the discussed infrastructure should be supported by an advanced 
network mechanism. In particular, the network mechanism should support the following 
key elements: 
1. Sensors 
The ultimate objective of a sensor system tasked to monitor a maritime domain is 
to provide as consistently reliable 24/7 real time picture, as less possible affected by 
extreme weather conditions. The main features of a sensor system satisfying the criteria 
for monitoring a maritime domain like the Gulf of Aden are listed below: “Continuous  
coverage of all Areas of Responsibilities (AORs), Capability of utilizing alternative 
Sensors in case of default, interconnectivity, scalability and mobility, advanced network 
infrastructure, high information quality.” 95 
2.  Maritime Command and Control Fusion Center 
The infrastructure discussed in this thesis should be also supported through a 
command and control center stationed in one of the relatively political stable countries of 
the region, since the compilation of maritime picture is a complex and challenging task. 
The Maritime Command and Control Fusion center would consist of two main sub-
departments: 
a. Command and Control Center (C2) 
b. Fusion Center 
The fusion center gathering all the information would be located in a stable 
strategic location in the Gulf of Aden, i.e Socotra Island, Somaliland. This C2 center 
would collect all the information, starting with the tethered aerostats, and notify merchant 
ships transiting in the area by all available means. Every effective military C2 system is 
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dictated by the following principles: “Command, proximity, support.”96 An important 
feature of C2 systems is that command relationships, whether direct or indirect, always 
remain active. Effective command requires a constant flow and exchange of information 
without any interference from various factors and third parties.97 This flow of 
information includes all the operational and informational data required by operational 
commanders to conduct successful anti-piracy operations and involves   senior tactical 
commanders and their subordinate commanders.98 In the case of naval operations, this 
exchange of information focuses on operational and intelligence information between 
operational and tactical headquarters.99  
A fundamental aspect of network hierarchy relates to the fact that the flow of 
information from one specific command level to senior or subordinate commands reflects 
the command hierarchy. However,   experience has demonstrated that, practically, a 
typical commander must establish communication and information flow one level up and 
two levels down in the command hierarchy.100 
3. Naval Assets 
In this thesis, it has been argued that a viable counter-piracy must include a series 
of coordinated efforts on a local, regional and international level. The conceptual model 
developed in this thesis attempts to incorporate all respective efforts. In particular, the C2 
Center would be established in a bordering country to the area: Yemen (Socotra Island) 
or Djibouti are potential hosting countries. Furthermore, since our area of focus is the 
maritime domain naval assets are required. The deployed naval forces can either have an 
international origin or regional origin. Currently, more than thirty countries contribute 
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naval forces; however, regional countries, Kenya, Yemen, Djibouti and Seychelles should 
be more engaged in this effort. However, the aim should be reduction of naval 
deployments to a minimum number where the majority of naval assets originate from 
regional countries. 
D. FUTURE MARITIME NETWORKS 
Every maritime challenge should be addressed driven by the quote stated below 
by Giulio Douhet, an Italian strategist in 1921:  
Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of 
war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes 
occur.101 
This thesis aims to transform the international community’s maritime security 
policy, which is heavily based on the deployment of naval units in the area.  The policy 
causes a significant economic burden to all the involved countries. In particular, this 
work proposes the implementation of innovative concepts and technologies to reduce 
naval units to the minimum number required to interdict pirate groups that remain 
undetected—and endanger the safe transit of merchant ships. Consequently, an 
imperative need is to develop maritime networks competent enough to monitor and deter 
pirate groups. 
Specifically, to successfully counter piracy, it is crucial to improve the recognized 
maritime picture, providing tactical commanders optimum situational awareness. 
Necessarily, maritime security depends on maritime surveillance, and there are inherit 
obstacles to be bypassed when conducting surveillance in an area as large as the Horn of 
Africa.  
Tactical commanders require an information infrastructure that is interconnected 
and supported by cutting-edge technologies. The architecture of a Command and Control  
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System network is composed of the following subsystems, which are integrated and form 
nodes: “navigation components, command and fusion centers, communication links, 
decision components (i.e computers), sensors.” 102 
One might expect that with the available volume of information, pirates can be 
easily deterred. However, this is not always the case, since a key factor to successfully 
conducting anti-piracy operations is to effectively process all the available information. A 
crucial component of the latter process is to identify all the important data, and after a 
reliable “data mining” process, to utilize them in the decision making process.103  
The following statement should dictate what the international community and 
coalition forces should attempt to establish in the future:  
Tactical networks or network centric systems, in which multiple sensors or 
geographically distributed units of highly mobile decision makers transfer 
and analyze data while operating on the move in distant areas.104  
It is quite evident that this approach of building maritime networks is applicable 
and adaptable to networks whose architecture includes a high number of nodes. Building 
a network is a relatively common procedure; however, in cases where the objective is to 
build wide networks, with architectures of numerous nodes, experimentation is required 
in order to test and evaluate fundamental system properties (i.e., hierarchy, adaptation, 
etc).105 
E. NETWORK HIERARCHY 
Hierarchy is a fundamental property in networks and defines the network 
architecture significantly. Consequently, it is important to present the network hierarchy 
in order to analytically depict the operating mechanism of the proposed conceptual 
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model. Every network has its own characteristics and specifically, the number of layers n 
and the contents of each layer.  Likewise, the quality and quantity of information shared 
between layers is exclusively designed for any individual network. In particular, there is 
one common principle always: the scope of each layer is to offer a specific type and 
amount of information to higher layers.106  
The behavior of man depends on the relevant context. Likewise, for successful 
communication between layers a specific set of rules and procedures   should be 
followed; otherwise, there is a strong chance that the communication would fail. 107 The 
set of these procedures and rules is officially described as a communication protocol.108 
Furthermore, a key aspect of this agreement between layers is the interface used each 
time the layers communicate. 109 
Many times a need emerges to redesign the network architecture   in order to 
facilitate the augmented needs for data fusion and dissemination. In particular, the 
network infrastructure supporting   ISR efforts against piracy should be able to deal more 
effectively with the information load between the “processing the analytic power resident 
afloat and the capacity ashore and reach-back nodes, as well.”110 
F. COMMUNICATION REQUIREMENTS 
The communication features of the communication scheme that would be able to 
support the needs for the discussed conceptual model are the following: “Accommodate 
mobile nodes, interoperable with existing systems, bi-directional channel, asymmetric 
bandwidth, Digital, time latency.” 111 
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A look at the above sensor requirements and to the relevant literature would 
suggest that networks should be considered as a “set of nodes interconnected through a 
number of links.”112 In particular, this work refers to a maritime domain protection 
system that would employ a set of sensors    to detect, deter and provide senior 
commanders the ability to conduct anti-piracy operations.  A mesh network structure in 
conjunction with a hierarchical structure appears to be the best network configuration to 
adopt. 











Figure 9.   Proposed Communication Scheme 
Figure 9 clearly depicts the structure of a hierarchical communication scheme that 
satisfies modern operational standards and provides flexibility as well.  
G. MARITIME SCENARIOS FOR CONSIDERATION 
In their book, Alberts and Hayes refer to the experimentation campaign concept 
as follows:  
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A series of related activities that explore and mature knowledge about a 
concept of interest.  Experimentation campaigns use the different types of 
experiments in a logical way to move from an idea or concept to some 
demonstrated military capability. Hence, experimentation campaigns are 
organized ways of testing innovations that allow refinement and support 
increased understanding over time.113   
The development of an initial concept to a concrete objective is a complicated task that 
requires a series of consecutive experiments structured in a logical sequence in order to 
reach the optimal result.  
1. Pareto Efficiency 
The Pareto set, along with the design parameters and the functional constraints, 
lay the foundation to start configuring the required maritime network to effectively 
support a Command and Control (C2) system that monitors a maritime domain in the 
wider area of the Horn of Africa. However, this does not imply that this is a static 
process; on the contrary, it is a dynamic process that constantly has to receive feedback in 
order to satisfy the rapidly increasing user needs. In particular, the network experts 
manage and modify when required the design variables. In other words, when dealing 
with practical problems, that include so many variants every optimization effort presents 
a great challenge. The Pareto criteria set provides a great tool for researchers aiming to 
address ad-hoc multi-objective optimization problems, and study the relationships 
between the design variables, functional constraints and the criteria constraints that 
evaluate  whether the outcome is acceptable or not. Specifically, C2 in Maritime 
Interdiction Operations (MIO) is an ideal area to apply this tool since C2 is by default is 
dynamic and constantly evolving.114 
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2. Objective 
The main objective of this thesis scenario is to explore and gain further insight 
into how an adaptive set of sub-hierarchical networks supporting the operational use of 
cutting edge technological sensors (aerostats + suitable radar sensors) in conjunction with 
naval assets, the majority provided from regional countries (Yemen, Seychelles, Somalia, 
Kenya), can be utilized in the Gulf of Aden for securing the Sea Lines of Comms (SLOC) 
from piracy.     
3. Design Variables 
Network design variables are independent features that can be structured in a 
fashion that the best outcome is produced for the whole process. The first challenging 
step is to identify all the involved variables and list them in order to progress with the 
next steps of the procedure. Another important aspect is to fully define all the design 
variables in conjunction with the proper metrics. The last step   provides the optimal 
solution   to manipulate each time the design variables   to optimize the final outcome.115  
The table below presents the fundamental design variables. During the whole process this 










Table 4.   Design Variables 
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Number of Platforms Integer Number 
Type of Platforms Special features 






4. Functional Constraints 
The functional constraints in the network offer an accurate insight into the 
capabilities that are available for the discussed network. Specifically, these constraints 
are being imposed by the surrounding environment and, if not satisfied, most likely the 
designed variables are neither applicable nor feasible. Conversely, this does not mean 
they are “a priori” fixed and cannot be negotiated. Rapid technological development is 
providing plenty of tools to overcome difficult situations or obstacles that in the near past 
seemed impossible. In our case, the functional constraints are mostly technological and 
economic. In the following table, four functional constraints are presented, stressing the 
issue of maximum bi-directional information, reliability and the economic cost of this 
infrastructure.116 
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The scenario defines 
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scenario each time 
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Table 5.   Functional Constraints 
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The functional constrains are time and the chosen scenario. For the scenario 
developed in this chapter, time is constrained by the activities defined in the scenario that 
occur in the assigned period, and as well by the economic cost. 
5. Partial Relationships for Experimentation 
Alberts and Hayes usefully not hypothesize that by defining a complete set of 
design variables, they render their problem   significantly less complex. Unfortunately, 
this is not true.  This is inadequate because of the large number of relationships between 
all the variables, and that in most cases only a few relationships are thoroughly 
studied.117 All of these relationships provide each respective system particular   strengths 
and weaknesses. However, the latter situation does not always work negatively since one 
of the reasons for conducting experiments is to study the dynamic relationships between 
design variables.118 
6. Scenario Overview 
The main objective is to secure a zone that extends from 100 to 300 nautical miles 
from the coastal lines. For this zone, the idea is to utilize innovative technologies and 
concepts such as the combined   use of tethered aerostats equipped with radar sensors and 
AIS equipment in conjunction with the support of naval assets patrolling the area. The 
number of assets and their level of technological development and the number, as well, of 
involved actors constitute the establishment of a fusion center mandatory, structured in 
way capable of processing all the gathered data and forward all the information towards 
the naval units. However, our attention remains on a wider area adjacent to the 100 nm 
zone off the coastline. Specifically, the area of interested is the zone between 100 and 
300 nm away from the coastline of Somalia. This area could be monitored through 
tethered aerostats equipped with suitable radar sensors (see Fig. 11).   
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The scenario would discuss a capacity building strategy based on a regional and 
an international level.  However, it is important to make some crucial assumptions; 
otherwise, our scenario could be easily characterized as utopia.  The current conditions 
regarding the Somali Transnational Federal Government (TFG) are quite difficult, in as 
much as it controls a very small percentage of the whole country. Consequently, for this 
scenario we assume   that   domestic conditions   will improve at least to a level 
permitting the foundation of a coastguard and police. 
7.  Scenario Initial Experimentation Plan 
In this scenario, two merchant ships considered as HVUs transit across the west 
coastline of Somalia. One is carrying humanitarian aid to Mogadishu, and the other is 
carrying radioactive material. The Maritime C2 and Fusion center receives intelligence of 










Figure 11.   Schematic Depiction of the Proposed Air Monitoring System 
Figures 11 and 12 offer a schematic depiction of the proposed air monitoring 
system with respect to the Somali coastline. This constitutes an initial approach; there is 
time and space to consider the exact geographic particularities and details, and since one 
of the main advantages of aerostat radar systems is their mobility, the discussed air 
monitoring system can easily be tested in other areas of need in the wider area of the 









Figure 12.   Footprint Aerostat Area of Coverage 
As stated, the technological assets proposed in thesis work are tethered aerostats 
with embedded radar and AIS equipment, capable of providing an effective footprint of 
200 nm. In the conceptual model described (every aerostat monitored area), a naval asset 
is disposed to patrol and act when the circumstances compel for it.  
8. Scenario Narrative 
The scenario is based on the assumption that the TFG government has assumed 
positive control over a small number of coastal cities; after the increase of active 
participation from regional institutions, i.e., the African Union, or individual neighboring 
countries in the level of peacekeeping contribution. There is a great incentive for the 
international community to deliver humanitarian aid. It is also assumed from the 
collection of credible intelligence indicates that there is a high possibility of pirate groups 
high jacking a merchant ship that carries radioactive material.  Also, weather conditions 
are moderate. The main challenge is to maintain a constant flow of information regarding 
the location and the status of these HVUs and, in case of danger, to react timely.  
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 Ship 1 
A merchant ship is carrying humanitarian aid under the umbrella of the World 
Food Program (WFP). The ship carries a large shipment with final destination the port of 
Mogadishu. The ship, in accordance with IMO requirements, is equipped with an AIS 
transponder / receiver. The C2 Center is coordinating efforts in order for the ship to arrive 
safely in Mogadishu. In the event of an unidentified contact in the monitored areas, the 
merchant ship will be instantly notified to alter its course   and a naval unit will engage 
the suspect vessel under orders of C2 center. 
• SHIP CHARACTERISTICS:   
 Length: 400 meters 
 Width: 40 meters 
 Tonnage: 100,000 tons  
 Economic Speed: 14 kts 
SHIP ITINERARY 
TIMELINE COURSE OF EVENTS REMARKS 
DAY 1 
Ship enters the international maritime 
traffic corridor. Ship is monitored from 
the C2 center 
 
Speed : 14 Kts 
DAY  2 
The ship continues its voyage without 
any interruption in the monitored areas. 
During the transit the C2 center collects 
information that pirate groups might 
attack a ship so, the C2 instructs to a 
naval asset to escort the unit and the ship 
to alter its initially scheduled course and 
proceed easterly. 
 
Speed : 14 Kts 
DAY   3 
The ship approaches the harbor of 
Mogadishu under the discreet 




Table 6.   Scenario 1 Ship Itinerary  
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Figure 13.   Schematic Illustration of the Merchant Ship's Entrance to Mogadishu 
        Ship 2 
• SHIP CHARACTERISTICS:   
 Length: 450 meters 
 Width: 40 meters 
 Tonnage: 200,000 tones 
 Economic Speed: 13 knots 
The merchant ship in this case carries radioactive material. The priority for the 
international community is to assure safe transit of the ship and, in the event that an 
attack occurs, to react proactively and deter pirates from highjacking the ship.  In the 
event of an unidentified contact in the monitored areas, the merchant ship will be notified 
instantly to alter its course and speed and allow the naval unit to engage the suspected 
















The ship enters the international 
maritime traffic corridor. 
 Ship is monitored from the C2 
center 
 
Speed : 13 Kts 
 
DAY  2 
During transit, after the 
appearance of unidentified 
contacts, potential pirate mother 
ships, the ship alters its course 
and the naval asset of the 
respective area escorts the 
merchant as long as the danger of 
the threat lasts.  
 
Speed : 13 Kts 
DAY   3 
 















Figure 14.   Schematic Illustration of the Merchant Ship's Transit 
9. Criteria Constraints 
The final part of a well-designed scenario inevitably includes a post-analysis 
phase. This is an issue of fundamental importance since it allows the evaluation of all the 
collected data in depth. The criteria constraints are a tool enabling involved personnel to 
process all the acquired data. Access feasibility is a crucial feature of this mechanism. 119 
The criteria constraints are of crucial importance since they provide the capability 
to determine whether the final product is acceptable in various aspects. Inverting the 
problem, the design and functional constraints must be structured in accordance with 
criteria constraints.120 The table below is a synopsis of the criteria to be examined to 
determine the functionality and whether the described conceptual model can be 
considered as robust. 
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Table 8.   Criteria constraints 
The three leading principles that should dictate the data collection process are:  
“Validity reliability, credibility.”  A very important feature of this process is the access 
availability. 121 
H. CONCLUSIONS 
It is very difficult to design an explicit, large-scale scenario, due to the fact that it 
is a dynamic process and always the experimentation team plays an important role in 
order to produce a credible outcome. However, if the previously described model is 
pursued the current large number of naval deployments will be significantly reduced, 
without compromising the operational needs and standards. 
The description of the discussed conceptual model clearly promotes an alternative 
solution implementing innovative concepts and establishes a permanent monitoring 
system in the Horn of Africa.  The continuation of numerous naval deployments without  
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any perspective in the near future of ending this situation clearly signals the need for the 
international community to tackle this issue in a different fashion that in the long run 
would prove to be efficient economically and operationally. 
The scenario discussed in this chapter demonstrates the potential of the 
conceptual model, in the problematic area in Horn of Africa and potentially before doing 
on the field experiments a simulation of the discussed scenario would provide a good 
start.122 The statistics describing the piracy phenomenon clearly stresses the dynamic 
aspect of the phenomenon and how pirate groups adjust their actions in conjunction with 
the political developments ashore. Practically, since pirate groups operate in various 
areas, counter measures should not be geographically anchored but easily deployable to 
the areas of danger and need. Tethered Aerostats with embedded Radar sensors are 
inherently given this advantage, the ability to identify pirate’s mother ships and 
suspicious patterns, and also present high potential for deployment in other areas in need 
of maritime surveillance.  
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 55
V. COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF A TETHERED AEROSTAT 
AIR MONITORING SYSTEM  
A. INTRODUCTION 
A major component in all decision-making processes is the amount of funds 
required to transform and implement a proposed concept. Even if the outcome of a 
concept might be definitely positive, if the amount of money required is extremely high 
the concept is turned down.  In particular, according to system engineering theory for a 
project to achieve the optimal affordability and meet the budget standards the whole 
process should be monitored at every step described below: 
Acquisition Cost: Research, design, testing, production and Construction,  
Operational Cost: Salary Cost, facilities, utilities, and energy 
consumption.  
 Product Distribution Cost: Shipping and Handling.  
 Software Cost: Development, operating, and maintenance software.  
 Maintenance Cost:  Customer service, onsite personnel training, supply 
and reserves, test and support equipment.  
 Training Cost: Operator and maintenance training.  
 Supply Support Cost: Spares, Inventory, and Material Support.  
 Retirement and Disposal.”123  
 
The costs stated above, added together are called the Life Cycle Cost (LCC) 
should always be taken into account since they constitute practically the total cost of the 
project over its expected life cycle. Practically, the technical side is tackled first, and then 
the economic aspect is addressed.124 
In sum, to analytically compute/estimate the total cost of a large technological 
infrastructure that utilizes assets not widely operated includes areas of uncertainty 
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regarding the exact economic cost.   Any effort to accurately estimate the total cost of the 
proposed air monitoring system in this thesis is subject to a lot of criticism. However, the 
main objective in this chapter is to provide an economic order of magnitude as a 
feasibility test of the whole concept to allow comparison with the current economic cost 
of deploying naval units in the area.  
B. ECONOMIC COST OF NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS IN THE HORN OF 
AFRICA 
In 2008, there was a dramatic increase in piracy incidents. The international 
community was forced to act immediately and decisively to secure the Sea Commons in 
the Gulf of Aden by heavily deploying naval assets in the area. In particular, more   than 
30 countries   under the leadership of the United States have formed CTF 151, a coalition 
with the ultimate objective of fight maritime terrorism, including piracy in the Middle 
East. 125 In 2009 the total number of naval ships participating in anti-piracy efforts was 
around thirty, all year long on a 24/7 mission. 126   
Any effort to compute the precise economic cost of the naval deployments in the 
area inevitably will include an area of uncertainty, since there are always indirect costs 
that cannot be accurately defined.127 On the other hand, due to the massive deployment 
of naval assets, from various organizations an estimate of the total economic cost is 
feasible. The average deployment cost of a frigate size ship is estimated to be around $1.3 
million per month.128 Since the average number of ships patrolling in the area is thirty, 
we can conclude that a minimum cost of the deployments in the area is around $40 
million per day. 129 
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Indicative also of the cost of fighting piracy in this fashion is that in 2009 the EU 
spent approximately $450 million supporting operation Atalanta (EUNAVFOR).130  The 
U.S., in fiscal year 2009, spent $64 million through Central Command supporting US 
flagged ships patrolling in the HoA.131 In addition to the cost above is the cost 
originating from ships deployed by independent countries to tackle piracy.  
The economic cost of the naval deployments discussed above raises important 
questions. In particular, the total economic cost of naval deployments fighting piracy 
every month is above $1 billion dollars. Another indirect cost that should be eluded is the 
opportunity cost for the contributing countries, since for every country would be 
different. In particular the reduction of naval units patrolling in the area would offer the 
countries an option of deploying their assets in other areas where their national interests 
are in stake.  
A high economic cost of that magnitude generates a sustainability issue in the 
long run since many countries now contributing forces most likely would not have the 
capacity to contribute forces for a long period of time, in light of the economic recession 
that is impacting a great number of countries.132 
C. ECONOMIC COST OF PROPOSED AIR MONITORING SYSTEM 
The computation of the exact economic cost is a complex process that 
overwhelms the scope of this thesis; however, it is important to present an economic 
outline of the proposed air monitoring infrastructure in order to present the feasibility 
and the economic benefits of adopting a capacity building strategy that utilizes the 
discussed innovative technological assets.  
In particular, the costs involved have to do with the procurement, operating and 
support costs. Even with the large number of uncertainties, the procurement cost of the 
balloons varies from $20 to $100 million, depending on the size and the offered set of 
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capabilities of the payloads.133 Furthermore, an important component of these advanced 
technological assets is the embedded sensor, for which a reasonable estimate is $20 
million.134  In addition, the operating and supporting cost is estimated to be in the range 
of hundreds of dollars of per hour. Consequently, considering the most demanding 
scenario of a 24/7 operation for 365 days, the supporting and operating cost is in the 
range of million dollars per year. For example, if the cost is $700 hundred an hour the 
total annual cost reaches approximately $6 million per year. 135 
However, apart from the stand alone economic analysis, there is an imperative 
need to include an operational component in this pursuit and, in particular, with issues 
related to the maritime domain and specifically the efficiency in regards to maritime 
surveillance.  
An approach that seems to offer an accurate depiction of the economic benefits of 
the discussed innovative assets in maritime surveillance is the cost to cover one square 
km; the ratio between the economic cost ($) and the covered area (m²). Aerostats with 
embedded radar sensors as payloads can maintain an effective footprint of 150 nm radius, 
as opposed to radar sensors carried by naval units that provide an effective coverage that 
reaches a surveillance circle with a radius of 30 nm.  
The next step is to compare the two methods of surveillance on an economic basis 
in order to determine whether there is potential in introducing this out-of-the-box 
approach as a countermeasure against piracy. An average cost per year including support 
and operating costs is approximately $6 million. Consequently, the discussed ratios are 
approximately: 
For an aerostat: $6 M / π * (150)²= $85 / km²  
For a ship: $12 *1.3M/ π * (30)²=$5520/ km²  
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135 Inside the Navy, Navy Eyes Aerostats for Affordable Long Duration Surveillance, 
http://www.tcomlp.com/resources/TCOM%20Inside%20the%20Navy%20Reprint%2012-06.pdf, (accessed 
on September 2010). 
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The ratio between the figures computed above is 0.18, which is rather indicative of 
the economic benefits in adopting a new model to accomplish maritime surveillance. On the 
other hand, considering that the minimum cost for a ship operating in the area is $1.3 million 
per month and there are more than 25 ships patrolling in the area. The average annual cost of 
naval deployments exceeds $10 billion. In addition to the previously stated cost , the 
economic cost from the ransom should be taken also into account into particular the Somali 
pirated have collected an amount which exceeds $100 million since 2007, since the ship 
owner policy is supporting piracy by paying ransom fees.136 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter demonstrated the comparative advantage of developing an air 
monitoring system to address the issue of piracy in contrast to the traditional deployments of 
naval assets in the troubled area. However, the development of this economic approach 
inevitably included a large number of uncertainties and many assumptions must be 
considered. Regardless of the number of uncertainties and assumptions, we know from 
experience that the contemporary method of addressing piracy despite the high economic cost 
produces only moderate operational results as it has been statistically demonstrated over the 
last years.  
In the introduction of this chapter it has been stated that the distance between a 
concept and the final implementation of a concept is tremendous; however the cost benefits 
from adopting a similar model clearly promotes the continuation of this research and 
provides the necessary momentum for further research and development. Even a partial 
adoption of the described model would provide significant economic benefits for all the 
players involved. However, it is important to keep in mind that the deployment of an air 
monitoring system of that magnitude is a long time commitment and the great challenge for 
the international community is to increase the level of participation from regional institutions 
and countries. Unfortunately, this prospect presents significant hazards since the political 
situation in the majority of these countries is very fragile, and a lot of attention is required for 
the regional players to be involved. 
                                                 
136 GAO, Maritime Security, Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan and Enhance Collaboration 
among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa, 1. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The issue of piracy, despite the international interest it has received  and the 
actions taken by the international community, in particular the deployment of naval 
forces, remains on the agenda and requires even more attention and action from 
international global players. Indicative of the serious escalation of the issue is the 
dramatic increase of piracy incidents in the wider area of the Horn of Africa and in other 
areas like the South China Sea, and off the Nigerian coasts. The current situation has led 
pirate groups to operate in areas out of reach from naval patrols and in neighboring seas. 
The current method of tackling piracy by sending naval forces is partially effective, but at 
the same time causes a great economic burden that exceeds the one billion dollars per 
month.  
The rise of piracy in the security agenda has brought to the table a whole new 
question of determining the optimal capacity building strategy to address piracy 
considering that pirate groups have adopted new tactics and take advantage of the 
political instability in Somalia and in neighboring countries. The domestic politic 
situation does not allow any drastic action on a domestic level to fight pirates. However 
this does not mean that the existing political entities in Somalia (Somaliland and 
Puntland) should not be supported in regards to equipment and “know how in 
strengthening local institutions like coastguard and police. Consequently, the strategic 
importance of sea commons would eventually force the international community to 
successfully address this phenomenon by utilizing cutting edge technological assets and 
implementing innovative operational concepts. 
Regarding piracy, the international community should try to think innovatively 
and integrate operational concepts that can meet the challenges of piracy nowadays, 
considering the occurrence of piracy attacks in a large number of areas that cannot be 




equipment offers an easily deployable solution in conjunction with a supporting 
intelligence policy would lead to augmented ISR capabilities constituting an advanced 
anti-piracy tactic. 
Since political instability in the wider area of the Horn of Africa is common and 
the prospect of overcoming this political problem does not appear in the near future, a 
different capacity building strategy should be pursued.  The main objectives of the 
capacity-building strategy presented in this thesis focuses on utilizing innovative 
technological assets that are easily deployed, not geographically anchored, and, in 
addition, offer augmented ISR capabilities. Technological assets incorporating all the 
previously discussed features are tethered aerostats with embedded sensors, specific 
UAVs and satellite assets. Despite the virtues of the discussed proposed capacity model it 
should always be kept in mind that a long time commitment is required and the goal 
during this whole process should be to achieve the highest level of contribution from 
regional players. An important feature of the cutting- edge technological assets presented 
in this thesis is the comparatively low economic cost that justifies the continuation of the 
research in this field despite the fact that in the end the capacity model described might 
not be the one adopted.   
The scenario discussed in this thesis aims to demonstrate the feasibility of the 
proposed conceptual model and how it could be applied in securing maritime corridors. 
However, since the economic aspect is a catalyst, an initial economic approach was 
attempted in order to determine whether there is any potential in further pursuing a 
potential application of the described model. Despite the fact that this approach included 
a significant number of uncertainties and assumptions, it finally yielded to promising 
results, economic wise. Consequently, the continuation of this research is more than 
welcome since even a partial adoption of the discussed model would provide significant 
economic benefits and in addition allow the involved countries to deploy their assets in 
other areas of need where their national interests compel for the deployment of naval 
assets. 
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Finally, it is important to consider that with the complicated contemporary 
political agenda in countries where piracy occurs, it is very difficult to totally eliminate 
piracy incidents; however the goal should be the drastic reduction of piracy incidents due 
to the severity of the political and economic bi-products. 
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